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The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)1 and its side
labor agreement, the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation
(NAALC),2 both went into effect on January 1, 1994.1 These agreements,
supporting globalization4 between Canada, Mexico, and the United
States, were signed with the intent of increasing economic growth and
employment in all three countries over a fifteen-year period.'
NAFTA proponents believed that it would serve as a stimulus for long-
term economic gains for all of the countries involved.' While these advo-
1. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 296 [hereinafter
NAFTA]. President Bill Clinton signed the NAFTA Implementation Act on December 8,
1993. See North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-
182 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA-IA].
2. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1499
(1993) [hereinafter NAALC].
3. See Betty Southard Murphy, NAFTA's North American Agreement on Labor Coop-
eration: The Present and the Future, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L. 403, 403 (1995) [hereinafter Mur-
phy, Present and Future]; see also Betty Southard Murphy, Washington: The Center for
Strategic and International Studies 1994, 16 Nw. J. Irr'L L. & Bus. 318, 318 (1995) (book
review) [hereinafter Murphy, Washington]; Teresa R. Favilla-Solano, Comment, Legal
Mechanisms for Enforcing Labor Rights Under NAFTA, 18 U. HAW. L. Rv. 293, 295
(1996); Bernard L. Weinstein, NAFTA After Four Years: Successes, Problems, and Chal-
lenges, 4-SUM NAFTA: L. & Bus. Rsv. AM. 109, 109 (1998).
4. See Michael H. Davis & Dana Neacsu, Legitimacy, Globally: The Incoherence of
Free Trade Practice, Global Economics and Their Governing Principles of Political Econ-
omy, 69 UMKC L. Rnv. 733,734 (2001) (describing globalization as "a political phenome-
non whose strategy is to internationalize capitalism through a process of legalization"); see
also THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE 9 (2000) (finding that "the
driving idea behind globalization is free-market capitalism ... globalization means the
spread of free-market capitalism to virtually every country in the world").
5. See Murphy, Present and Future, supra note 3, at 404; see also NAFI'TA, supra note
1; NAFTA-IA, supra note 1; Murphy, Washington, supra note 3, at 318 (stating the goals of
NAFTA).
6. See Murphy, Present and Future, supra note 3, at 404 (suggesting that competition
with the European Union and Asia were also important in the implementation of
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cates suggest the trade agreement has been successful, others disagree.7
Opponents point to, among other things, the ineffectiveness of the labor
accord in protecting workers and major job losses in various industries.8
Specifically, NAFTA has negatively impacted labor union organizing
drives, ethnic minorities, and women in the United States. Today, the
debate on NAFTA's ramifications rages on while negotiations to create a
new western hemispheric trading bloc, with many trade leaders touting
NAFTA as an appropriate model from which to build upon, are under-
way.9 This comment asks, what is the cost of free trade? The answer is
that nothing is ever free. Instead, union organizing drives and minorities
are paying the price for "free" trade.
The question of who pays for "free" trade is important because of the
potential of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FIAA) having the
same effect on minorities as NAFTA. If NAFTA, which includes only
Canada, Mexico, and the United States, has had a negative impact on
union organizing drives and minority employees, then FTAA, which will
include most of the Western Hemisphere, will have an even greater im-
pact on these groups. FTAA should not be allowed to repeat NAFTA's
mistakes. Given the problems NAFTA has created for organized labor,
minorities, and women, another blueprint should be utilized for the more
encompassing FTAA. Otherwise, the United States government, by way
NAFrA); see also Favilla-Solano, supra note 3, at 293-94 (agreeing that competition with
other trade agreements like the European Economic Community and the Caribbean Com-
mon Market were driving forces in creating NAFTA).
7. See Sidney Weintraub, The Meaning of NAFTA and its Implications for tse FTAA, 6
NAFTA: L. & Bus. Rnv. AM. 303, 303 (2000); see also Punuc CmzEN, NAFTA at
FIVE-SCHOOL OF REAL LIFE REsULTs (1999) [hereinafter Punuc CmzmN, NAFTA AT
FrE] (finding that NAFTA has ultimately failed in providing the benefits that were prom-
ised by proponents), available at httpJ/www.citizen.org/trade/nafta/votes/arti-
cles.cfm?ID=6473 (last visited Feb. 12, 2002); UNION OF NEEDLETr~t.ADE, INDUSrAIAL,
AND INDUsTRIAL TXnLE EMPLOYEES (UNITE), THE NAFTA ScsANt (1997) (criticizing
NAFTA for taking jobs and being a disaster for workers' rights in the United States, Ca-
nada, and Mexico), available at http'//%vwv.uniteunion.orglreclaim/politicalarchiveinafta/
nafta.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2002).
8. See Favilla-Solano, supra note 3, at 298-301 (1996) (detailing the viewpoints of vari-
ous opponents of NAFTA); see also Michael S. Barr et al., Labor and Environmental
Rights in the Proposed Mexico-United States Free Trade Agreement, 14 Hous. J. lsr,'. L 1,
1-3 (1991) (asserting the concerns of labor advocates and environmentalists with the then
proposed NAFTA); William Cunningham & Segundo Mercado-Liorens, The North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement: The Sale of U.S. Industry to ite Lowest Bidder, 10 Hors-rsA
LAB. LJ. 413, 413-15 (1993) (discussing the problems associated with Mexican
maquiladoras).
9. See Ambler Moss & Stephen Lande, A Critical Year For Hemispheric Free Trade:
Can Countries Agree on a Blueprint?, 28 U. MiAMI INTER-AM. L R-v. 507,509-516 (1997)
(recognizing the difficulty the Unites States has had gaining fast track authority for FTAA,
and the effect this has on establishing a hemispheric free trade zone).
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of free trade agreements, will continue to exacerbate racial and gender
divides within this country. 10
I. INTRODUCTION
NAFTA proponents have expected great benefits from this North
American partnership since its enactment." The United States was ex-
pected to become more competitive in the global economy, and the
George H. Bush administration anticipated the creation of 320,000 more
jobs for the United States alone. 2 Debatably, the State of Texas has
reaped the most benefit from the agreement, 3 and the economic boom of
the 1990s has been attributed in part to NAFTA.14 But, even prior to the
NAFTA agreement, opponents urged each country to realize that free
trade would not only lead to economic gains, but could also lead to signif-
icant problems for labor standards, workers' rights, and union organizing
drives. 15
The effect of NAFTA on union organizing drives is of particular con-
cern to minorities and women. Situations that have a negative impact on
America's organized workers have an exponential impact on the minority
community.' 6 These individuals have a disproportionately higher number
of jobs in the industries that are most affected by NAFTA. -7 Addition-
10. See Jose E. Alvarez, Critical Theory and the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment's Chapter Eleven, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. Rnv. 303, 303 (1996-97) (utilizing criti-
cal race theory to examine NAFrA's Chapter Eleven Provisions that govern foreign direct
investment).
11. See Thomas J. Schoenbaum, The North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA): Good for Jobs, Good for the Environment, and for America, 23 GA. J. IN-r'L &
CoMP. L. 461, 466-467 (1993) (utilizing economic studies to demonstrate that NAFTA
would have a small impact on labor in the U.S.); see also For NAFTA, THE Nnw REPUILIC',
Oct. 11, 1993, at 1.
12. See Favilla-Solano, supra note 3, at 297.
13. See Weinstein, supra note 3, at 110 (identifying Texas as the largest exporting state
to Mexico, totaling $18.9 billion). But see PUBLIC CIZEN, NAFrA's BROKEN PROMISuS:
THE COST TO TEXAS OF OUR FAILED EXPERIMENT WITH NAFTA [hereinafter PU13LIC
CITIZEN, BROKEN PROMISES] (determining that NAFTA has created health and safety is-
sues for Texans, as well as job losses).
14. See Weinstein, supra note 3, at 112-113 (stating that from 1994-1997 U.S. xports
to its NAFTA partner Mexico increased sixty-nine percent to $71 billion); see also Wein-
traub, supra note 7, at 306 (estimating that over 15 million jobs have been added to the
economy since NAFTrA went into effect).
15. See Favilla-Solano, supra note 3, at 295, 298-301.
16. See Clarence Lusane, Persisting Disparities: Globalization and the Economic Status
of African Americans, 42 How. L.J. 431, 434 (1999) (recognizing that generally the black
community suffers disproportionately from globalization); see also Lester Henry, NAFTA
AND GATT: WORLD TRADE POLICY IMPACTS ON AFRICAN AMERICANS (1995).
17. See Lusane, supra note 16, at 443-45 (noting women, Blacks, and Latinos as having
more jobs in the manufacturing and apparel industries, the sectors most negatively im-
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ally, these groups have a history of discrimination in the workplace, and
therefore would have a greater need for the protections union member-
ship is intended to provide.'" Collective bargaining emphasizes equal pay
and fair treatment in the workplace, two things that are essential for wo-
men and minorities.
President Bill Clinton negotiated the North American Agreement on
Labor Concerns (NAALC),19 in an attempt to lay the labor movement's
fears to rest. Before the implementation of NAALC, free trade and labor
movements were not directly linked to each other through any written
agreements.20 For the first time, the United States attempted to address
the anxieties of the labor movement in a free trade agreement (FTA).1
Political ties between Mexican labor unions and the Mexican govern-
ment, however, caused doubt that unions could effectively represent
pacted by NAFrA); Stanley M. Spracker & Gregory J. Mertz, Labor Issues Under the
NAFTA: Options in the Wake of the Agreement, 27 INr'L LAw. 737, 738 (1993) (citing Po-
tential Impact on the U.S. Economy and Selected Industries of tie North American Free
Trade Agreement, Inv. No. 332-337, U.S.I.T.C. Pub. 2596, at 2-5 (Jan. 1993)) (acknowledg-
ing the automobile and apparel as industries expected to "experience losses" as a result of
NAFrA).
18. DERMS A. DESLIPPE, RiGHTs NOT Roses: UNIONS AND TUiE Rise or WORKING-
CLASS FEMrISM, 1945-80, at 117 (2000) (acknowledging that the struggles of racial and
gender equality in the labor movement are intertwined, as evident throughout Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964). Cf. Organized Labor in the Twentieth.Century South 60-112
(Robert H. Zieger, ed. 1991) [hereinafter ORGANIZED LAB3OR] (highlighting the roles that
race and gender played in southern labor history). See also MELINDA CIIATEAUVERT,
MARCHING TOGETHER: WOMEN OF THE BROTHERHOOD OF St EFP'ING CAR PORTERS
(1998) (detailing the participation of women in the establishment of the first national trade
union for African Americans). But see Benjamin W. Wolkinson, Blacks, Unions, and the
EEOC (1973) (challenging racial and gender discrimination within the unions themselves).
See generally JOHN C. BERG, UNEQUAL STRUGGLE: CLASS, GENDER, RACE, AND PoWER
IN THE U.S. CONGRESS (1997) (arguing that the capitalist economy structure works against
progressive congressional action).
19. The Side Agreement on Environmental Cooperation was also negotiated as a sec-
ond side agreement to address environmental concerns. North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC), Sept. 13,1993,32 I.L.M. 1480;see also Jonathan S.
Blum, The FTAA and the Fast Track to Forgetting the Environment: A Comparison of the
NAFTA and tire MERCOSUR Environmental Models as Framples for the Hemisphere, 35
TEx. INT'L L. J. 435, 442, 448 (2000) (presenting a blueprint for an FTAA environmental
model based on the MERCOSUR and the NAFrA environmental regimes).
20. See Karen Vossler Champion, Comment, Who Pays for Free Trade? Tie Dilemma





Mexican labor objectives.22 NAALC addressed the labor movements'
concerns in Canada, Mexico, and the United States.3
Since the nation was operating at near full employment through most
of the 1990s,24 it would seem as if wages would have increased and work-
ers would have had more job security. However, worker earnings did not
increase and employees did not enjoy increased job security.25 Job secur-
ity is lacking due to the increased fear stemming from employers' en-
hanced opportunity to move to another country, namely Mexico, to
exploit cheap labor.26
The global economy has made many employees fearful that they are
dispensable.27 Employers suppress wages through threats of shifting pro-
duction28 to other countries.29 The fear of plant closures has also im-
pacted union organizing drives because employers use the threat of
mobility, among other tactics, as a way to intimidate workers and make
them afraid to join unions. 0
NAFTA has had a substantial impact on American workers. Subse-
quently, this has negatively affected labor union organizing drives, minor-
22. Id. at 225 (stating that concerns arose due to Mexico's relaxed enforcement of
their existing labor laws); see also Favilla-Solano, supra note 3, at 302-317 (noting that
although Mexico has extensive labor legislation, these laws are rarely enforced).
23. Roy J. Adams & Parbudyal Singh, Early Experience with NAFIA's Labour Side
Accord, 18 COMP. LAB. L.J. 161, 162 (1997); see also Favilla-Solano, supra note 3, at 295
(stating that in response to these concerns, the three nations negotiated side agreements on
environmental and labor cooperation).
24. See Weintraub, supra note 7, at 306 (identifying the United States as almost at full
employment status).
25. See id. at 307; see also KATE BRONFENBRENNER, UNEASY TERRAIN: THE IMPACI'
OF CAPITAL MOBILrrY ON WORKERS, WAGES, AND UNION ORGANIZING 8 (2000).
26. See Weintraub, supra note 7, at 304-05 (expressing concern regarding the motives
behind trade agreements); see also BRONFENBRENNER, supra note 25, at 8.
27. BRONFENBRENNER, supra note 25, at 8 (explaining findings of threats by employ-
ers of plant closures).
28. "Shifting production" is a phrase used to describe the process when parts and
components are shipped to a country like Mexico to undergo final assembly, and then
exported to another country like the United States for consumption. David A. Gantz, The
United States and the Expansion of Western Hemisphere Free Trade: Participant or Ob-
server?, 14 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. LAW 381, 383 (1997).
29. Weintraub, supra note 7, at 307 (explaining the wage-depressing effect in the
United States due to the availability of cheaper labor and parts in developing countries).
30. BRONFENBRENNER, supra note 25, at 8 (stating that employers use threats of plant
closure and mobility in an attempt to negatively impact union organizing campaigns).
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ities, and female employees.31 This is very important in light of the fact
that negotiations are underway to enact the FTAA.32
The FrTAA would include the three NAFTA countries as well as all
other nations in the Western Hemisphere (except Cuba), thereby creating
the largest free trade zone in the world.3 FTAA would span from the tip
of Argentina to the top of Alaskal The plans for FTAA began in De-
cember 1994 at the Summit of the Americas in Miami, Florida, where the
leaders of all thirty-four American democracies agreed to enact a free
trade agreement by 2005.1 Given the detrimental impact of NAFTA on
union organizing drives and minorities, NAFTA should not be used as the
basis for the FTAA.
This comment will discuss the negative impact that NAFTA has had on
union organizing, and the resulting impact on minority and women work-
ers. The argument is that NAFTA should not be used as the only model
for FTAA, given the problems it has created for labor union organizing
drives, minorities, and women. Other alternatives, including subsequent
enhancements to NAFTA, can be utilized as the basis for FTAA, which
will protect minority workers' ability to remain fairly paid, safe, and se-
cure in their jobs in an expanded free trading bloc.
31. See id. NAFTA increased the trade deficit and contributed to a competitive global
economy. See id. In turn, this terminated many jobs and closed plants in the United
States. See id. at 7. The opportunities to be aboard allowed companies to threaten em-
ployees that unionizing would cause plant closures. See id. at 8. Further, in NAFTA's first
three years of existence, it caused 395,000 jobs to be lost. Jesse Rothstein & Robert Scott,
NAFTA's Casualties: Employment Effects on Men, Women, and Minorities, available at
http//epinet.orglIssuebriefs/ibl20.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2002). The United States' in-
creased trade with Canada and Mexico between 1993 and 1996 caused 141,000 women to
be unemployed and approximately 60,000 minorities to be unemployed. See id.
32. See David Lopez, Dispute Resolution Under MERCOSUR from 1991 to 1996: Im-
plications for the Formation of the Free Trade of the Americas, 3-SPR NAFTA: L & Bus.
Rnv. AM. 3 (1997); The Americas Drift Towards Free Trade, ECONOMIST, Jul. 8,1995, at
35 [hereinafter Americas Drift] (reporting that the United States favored an expansion of
NAFTA by way of the FTAA).
33. See James B. Parks, Opening Doors for Global Fairness, America at Work (AFL-
CIO, Washington, D.C.), June 2001, at 17, 18 (stating that the passage of FTAA is a high
priority for both President George W. Bush and American big business).
34. Murphy, Washington, supra note 3, at 321.
35. Lopez, supra note 32, at 3 (suggesting that even if a hemispheric trade pact is not
complete by 2005, a trading bloc of the Western hemisphere seems inevitable); see also
Frederick M. Abbott, Foundation-Building for Western Hemispheric Integration, 17 Nw. 1.
INr'L L. & Bus. 900 (1996-97).
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I. HISTORICAL ROLE OF LABOR UNIONS AND WORKERS IN THE
UNITED STATES: MAKING THE CONNECrION TO FREE TRADE
"Unions: The people that brought us the weekend. 36
During the twentieth century, the American labor movement made
great gains that benefited both unionized and non-unionized workers.37
It is necessary to examine the history of the labor movement before being
able to thoroughly connect labor issues with free trade. The following is a
brief chronology of the labor movement from the years leading up to the
passage of NAFTA to the present.
Although the labor movement came from humble beginnings, it has
endured three centuries.3" Nineteenth and early twentieth century em-
ployers, even more than today, identified labor as an exploitable com-
modity required for industrial development.39 Early unions made many
hard fought gains and faced resistance and violence along the way.40 In
1886, the American Federation of Labor (AFL) was founded with the
goal of using collective bargaining power to increase wage earnings and
labor standards.4' By 1914, the "elite" working-class consisted of over 2
million AFL members.42 Although many early unions did not achieve
this level of success, they all generally promoted fair labor standards and
eight-hour work days.43
In time, labor laws in the United States changed in favor of employees'
protection instead of employers' profiteering.44 The National Labor Re-
lations Act recognizes the unequal power between employers, employees,
36. Author unknown, quote taken from a bumper sticker.
37. See generally, Champion, supra note 20, at 186 (stating that American unions'
early struggles were beneficial for both unionized and non-unionized employees).
38. See id. at 190 n.50 (noting that there were early labor unions in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries); see also ARCHIBALD COX ET AL., LABOR LAW (13th ed. 2001) (noting
that labor unions began as early as the eighteenth century).
39. Terry Collingsworth, American Labor Policy and the International Economy: Clar-
ifying Policies and Interest, 31 B.C. L. RFv. 31,37 (1989); see also Champion, supra note 20,
at 189 (stating that early labor unions were viewed as an exploited commodity).
40. See Cox et al., supra note 38, at 13-15; see also Champion, supra note 20, at 187-93.
During this time, the military was used to minimize collective worker action. See id. at 190
n.54. The AFL overcame opposition and were successful in their labor agenda. Id.
41. See Cox ET AL., supra note 38, at 13-14; see also Champion, supra note 20, at 190
n.54. The AFL membership increased, due in part to Congress' structural changes. BVRO,
supra note 18, at 84. AFL members assisted in electing unionists into Congress. Id. The
unionists in Congress assured that the AFL's goals were included in the Progressive legisla-
tive program. Id.
42. See Cox ET AL., supra note 38, at 13-14; see also Champion, supra note 20, at 190
n.54 (1996) (stating that the AFL's membership consisted of the "elite" working class).
43. See Champion, supra note 20, at 190.
44. See National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1994) [hereinafter
NLRA] (discussing the importance of protecting employee's rights to collectively bargain),
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and unions.45 At their peak during the 1950s, unions held 35% of all non-
agricultural employees in the United States.46
American workers formed unions to allow weak individuals to join to-
gether and prosper based on the idea that there is strength in numbers.47
Women and minorities have historically been marginalized in the work-
place, and benefit the most from collective bargaining.4 s Initially, how-
ever, unions, in many instances, vehemently opposed female and minority
membership. 49 Women and minorities have since gained access to union
membership. Currently, 11.7% of unionists are women5 In addition,
Black men and women unionize at the highest rate of any racial group at
19% and 15%, respectively.5 Latino men's unionization rate is 12%, and
Latina women are at 10%.52 Asian-American men and women both
unionize at a rate of 12%.51 By 2001, minority unionization rates com-
pared to, if not exceeded, that of Whites.'
From the 1950s, when union membership peaked, through the early
1990s, union membership decreased dramatically.55 In 1954, 35% of
American workers belonged to unions 6 While this percentage fell over
time, the total number of union members increased from 17 million in
1954 to 20.2 million in 1978.57 But, by 1983, membership decreased to
45. See id. (noting that unequal bargaining power lowers wage rates and hinders the
commerce flow).
46. Champion, supra note 20, at 186.
47. See generally id. at 187 (explaining the American workers' transformation into a
strong and unified voice).
48. See DESLIPPE, supra note 18, at 114 (discussing that women challenging collective
bargaining agreements allowed for better opportunities for wages and maternity leave).
49. Id. at 114. During World War II, America depended on women to sustain the
workforce. Id. Once the postwar reconstruction began, women like Olga Madar were laid
off from their jobs. Id. The 1950s proved to be the decade in which women unionists
began their struggle to be included in the labor movement. Id. Despite union opposition,
Madar and other women unionists helped pass the Equal Pay Act of 1963 and Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that included a clause prohibiting sex discrimination. Id.
50. See AFL-CIO, UNION DIFFERENCE: UNIONS ARE IMPORTANT FOR VOMEN, avail-
able at http./www.aflcio.orgluniondifferenceluniondiffl3.htm [hereinafter AFL-CIO, Wo-




54. See id. (finding that white men's unionization rate is at 15%, while white women's
is at 11%).
55. See AFL-CIO, UNION DIFFERENCE: UNION ME.iBERSHP TRENDS, available at
http://www.aflcio.orgluniondifferenceluniondiffll.htm [hereinafter AFL-CIO, Mr-mr-R.





17.7 million members, or 20.1% of the work force.5" At the beginning of
the 1990s, union membership dropped to only 16% of the American work
force.59 By 1996, union members represented 13% of nonagricultural
workers in the United States.60 In 2001, 13.5% of the American
workforce, or 16.3 million workers, was unionized.6
By the time Congress enacted NAFTA in 1994, union membership be-
gan a steady decline.62 This was due in part to a decreased emphasis on
grass-roots union organizing, and unions becoming comfortable with their
perceived political and social influence. 63 Although internal problems
were important, the increase in the number of international trade agree-
ments, specifically NAFTA, has played a role in decreasing union mem-
bership.' Trade agreements like NAFTA have given employers
bargaining power to threaten plant closures and make employees appre-hensive about joining unions. 65 These threats were only one of the many
concerns held by NAFTA opponents, and a reason that the North Ameri-
can Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC) was created.66 Both
NAFTA supporters and opponents had varying expectations of the
treaty. The next section explores the passage of NAFTA and its effect on
American workers from both perspectives.
III. LEADING Up TO NAFTA AND FTAA
A. International Agreements Leading to NAFTA
The United States entered into other trade agreements that served to
some extent as precursors to NAFTA and its eventual successor, FTAA.67
58. See id.
59. See Champion, supra note 20, at 186.
60. See id. at 187.
61. See AFL-CIO, MEmBERSHP, supra note 55.
62. See Champion, supra note 20, at 186 (stating that by 1991 union membership de-
creased to 16%); see also Murphy, Present and Future, supra note 3, at 403 (supporting that
Congress enacted NAFrA on January 1, 1994).
63. Bruce Raynor, Inaugural Address to the Union of Needletrades, Industrial, and
Textile Employees, AFL-CIO (UNITE) (July 2001).
64. See Spracker & Mertz, supra note 17, at 742-43 (reporting that because of NAFI'A
union membership has declined and may continue to decline).
65. See BRONFENBRENER, supra note 25, at 28 (reporting that employees fear unioniz-
ing because of plant closure threats).
66. See Murphy, Present and Future, supra note 3, at 405. Congress included a provi-
sion in NAFTA stating that NAFTA would only go into effect once Canada, Mexico, and
the United States signed the NAALC. Id. The three countries signed the agreement to
settle concerns regarding internationally recognized worker rights. Id.
67. See generally Matthew Schaefer, Searching for Pareto Gains in the Relationship
Between Free Trade and Federalism: Revisiting the NAFTA, Eyeing the FTAA, 23 CAN.-U.S.
L.J. 441, 450-54 (1997).
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These agreements are important because they provide the background
and basis for the creation of NAFTA. s Also, international agreements
between other Western Hemisphere countries, such as MERCOSUR and
the Andean Pact, are pertinent because they will be germane in the for-
mation of FTAA from a non-United States perspective.69 Together, the
various trade agreements from the entirety of the Americas will play a
significant role in the formation of the FTAA.7
Historically, agreements between different countries focused on peace
and security.71 In time, foreign affairs were linked with domestic af-
fairs.72 In 1919, international discussions led to the establishment of the
International Labor Organization (ILO), which in the 1950s negotiated
agreements for human rights.73 The ILO led to the creation of the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATI) in 1947. 4
The GAT led the way for world trade for almost fifty years.7 5 Subse-
quent negotiating rounds to GATT followed, and the seventh GATr
round, known as the Tokyo Round of 1979, focused on non-tariff barri-
ers.76 The Uruguay Round of the GAIT was approved in 1994, and
culminated in the creation of the World Trade Organization.7
During the period that the United States was negotiating trade obliga-
tions under the GATT's Uruguay Round, it also began considering the
expansion of its free trade agreement with its largest trading partner, Ca-
nada.7" NAFTA is the result of incorporating Mexico into the previously
68. See generally id.
69. See id. at 444.
70. See id.
71. See id. at 449.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 450.
74. The ILO was created as part of the Treaty of Versailles. See Christopher R. Cox-
son, Comment, The 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work
Promoting Labor Law Reforns Through the ILO as an Alternative to Imposing Coercive
Trade Sanctions, 17 DicK. J. INT'L L. 469,469-70 n.5 (1999). In 1946, it became part of the
United Nations. Id. See also Jay M. Vogelson, International Labor Organization, Report of
the ABA Section on International Law and Practice, 30 INT'L L 653, 654-63 (1996).
75. Schaefer, supra note 67, at 450.
76. Id.
77. See, eg., Frederick W. Mayer, Labor, Environment, and the State of U.S. Trade
Politics, 6 NAFrA: L. & Bus. REv. AM. 335 (2000); Coxson, supra note 74.
78. See Schaefer, supra note 67, at 451. Cf. JAMES MACGREGOR BuNs & GEORGIA
J. SORENSON, DEAD CENTER CLNToN-GoRE LEADERSHIP AND TiE PniLS OF MODERA.
"noN 194 (1999) (stating that Canada is the United State's largest trading partner, and
NAFTA was designed to expand on the free trade agreement existing between the United
States and Canada since January 1, 1989).
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established Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA). 79
President Ronald Reagan proposed CUSFTA in 1985 to Canadian Prime
Minister Brian Mulroney in an effort to end all tariffs and trade barriers
existing between the countries within a ten-year period.8° CUSFTA went
into effect on January 1, 1989."1 In January 1991, negotiations began to
expand CUSFTA to include Mexico.' These negotiations eventually led
to NAFIA.
B. Other Free-Trade Pacts of the Western Hemisphere
Although NAFTA has been suggested as the model for FTAA, there
are other free trade agreements in the Western Hemisphere which also
may come into play during FTAA negotiations.8 3 By 1995, there were
twenty-three free trade pacts between the thirty-four democracies of the
Western Hemisphere. 4 The more prominent agreements are: NAFTA,
MERCOSUR, the Andean Pact, the Central American Common Market
(CACM), the Group of Three, and the Caribbean Community (CAR-
ICOM).85 These agreements are all important because FTAA will have
to integrate NAFTA and these other free trade pacts.8 6 Therefore, as is
the case in the NAFTA context, established workers' rights and labor
standards will be a major concern to every nation involved in FTAA.s7
The following is an overview of the major trade agreements existing to-
day in the Western Hemisphere.
79. See, e.g., Favillo-Solano, supra note 3; Ruth Agather & Timothy N. Tuggery, The
Meat and Potatoes of the North American Free Trade Agreement, 24 ST. MARY'S L. J. 829,
831 (1993). See also NAFTA, supra note 1.
80. Sheila M. Raftery, Comment, Safety Net and Measuring Rod: The North American
Free Trade Agreement Transitional Adjustment Assistance Program, 12 TEMP. INw'L &
CoMP. L.J. 159, 161 (1998). See also EDWARD S. KAPLAN, AMERICAN TRADE POLICY, 137
(1996).
81. Schaefer, supra note 67, at 449.
82. Raftery, supra note 80, at 162.
83. See Carol Stump, Comment, Free Trade Area of the Americas (fTAA), 4 J. ITrr'L
L. & PRAc. 153, 154 (1995).
84. See id. at 155.
85. See id.
86. See id. at 155-56.
87. The Republican Congressional leaders, allied with the business community, are
now attempting to exclude labor and environmental standards in the proposed FTAA in
order to better negotiate with countries that do not insist on higher standards. See Freder-
ick W. Mayer, Labor, Environment, and the State of U.S. Trade Politics, 6 NAFTA: L. &
Bus. REv. AM. 335,336 (2000). Many developing countries view the U.S. requirements of
social regulations as potentially depressing their economic growth and encroaching upon
their national sovereignty. Id.
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1. MERCOSUR
The Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR), enacted in 1994,
is a trade agreement between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uru-
guay-' The union of these countries comprises a gross domestic product
(GDP) of nearly $1 trillion and encompasses some 200 million consum-
ers.89 In 1996, the MERCOSUR member-states and Chile entered into a
free trade agreement, making Chile an associate-member to the customs
union.9' Furthermore, MERCOSUR has discussed efforts to merge with
the five countries that comprise the Andean Pact.91
MERCOSUR provides for the free disbursement of goods, services,
labor and capital in its member countries. 2 MERCOSUR is more com-
prehensive than NAFTA because it adds a customs union to the free
trade agreement that coordinates a common external tariff policy.93
Although MERCOSUR does not include the United States, Mexico, or
Canada, this trade agreement is a powerful trading bloc in South America
and the Western Hemisphere.94 Commentators have noted that "it would
be a mistake for North Americans to underestimate the power of
MERCOSUR."95 This customs union is important because its member-
states are likely members of FrAA.96 The members of NAFTA will have
to negotiate with MERCOSUR's member-states and agree on a trade
pact that is suitable for the entire Western Hemisphere.'
88. Lopez, supra note 32, at 5.
89. Id.
90. See id.; see also Hunter R. Clark & Amanda Velazquez, Foreign Direct Investment
in Latin America: Nicaragua - A Case Study, 16 Am. U. IN"L L REv. 743, 751 (2001)
(including Bolivia and Chile as associate members of MERCOSUR).
91. See Lopez, supra note 32, at 5; see also Clark & Velazquez, supra note 90, at 751.
92. Treaty Establishing a Common Market (MERCOSUR), Mar. 26, 1991, 30 I.LM.
1041 (1991).
93. See Frank J. Garcia, "Americas Agreements" - An Interim Stage in Building the
Free Trade Area of the Americas, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L 63,75 (1997) (outlining the
major trade agreements in North America, South America and the Caribbean). See also
Kenneth W. Abbott & Gregory W. Bowman, Economic Integration in the Americas: "A
Work in Progress," 14 Nw. J. INT'L L & Bus. 493 (1994) (critiquing the NAFrA model of
expansion).






2. The Andean Pact
The Treaty of Cartagena created the Andean Pact.98 Established in
1969 as a measure to compete with the traditional trading powers of Mex-
ico, Brazil, and Argentina, its founding parties included Bolivia, Chile,
Columbia, Ecuador, and Peru.99 Today, the Pact includes Bolivia, Co-
lombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. 100 The Andean Pact works to harno-
nize specific areas within the member nations, particularly foreign capital
and technology transfer rules. 10' Additionally, and unlike NAFTA, the
Andean Pact intended to limit the presence of multi-national corpora-
tions (MNCs) in the region by applying strict regulations and
obligations.'0"
3. The Central American Common Market (CACM) 10 3
Currently, the Central American Common Market (CACM) encom-
passes El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Honduras. 4 CACM was the earliest
Latin American regional trade agreement. 105 It was established, in part,
to combat great poverty in economies that were largely agricultural. 10 6
Unfortunately, the extreme local and regional strife in Central
America during the 1970s and 1980s led to a derailment of CACM.'0 7
98. Treaty of Cartagena, Agreement on Sub-regional Integration, May 26, 1969, 2 BA.
sic DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 597 (Stephen Zamora & Ronald A.
Brand eds., 1990).
99. See JOSEPH GRUNWALD ET AL., LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIC INTERORATION
AND U.S. POLICY 56 (1972) (detailing the motivations in creating the Andean pact).
100. In 1973, Venezuela joined the Andean Pact and Chile left in 1976. See Garcia,
supra note 93, at 76 n.58. Peru declined membership to the Pact in 1992 but initiated
involvement with Pact members through bilateral agreements. Id.
101. See id. at 76. See generally, Abbott & Bowman, supra note 93 (detailing the
motivations in creating the Andean Pact).
102. Ultimately, limiting foreign investment failed in the Andean Pact. See Garcia,
supra note 93, at 76 n.61.
103. Treaty of Managua, General Treaty on Central American Economic Integration,
Dec. 13, 1960, 2 BASIC DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 529 (Stephen
Zamora & Ronald A. Brand eds., 1990).
104. Nicaragua was a founding member of CACM, but later withdrew. See, e.g., Gar-
cia, supra note 93, at 77; Paul A. O'Hop, Jr,. Hemispheric Integration and the Elimination
of Legal Obstacles Under a NAFTA-Based System, 36 HARV. INT'L L. J. 127, 128 (1995).
105. See Garcia, supra note 93, at 77.
106. Id. The agreement created by CACM has been described as an experiment be-
cause of the circumstances it was created under, including "extreme local strife, great pov-
erty, and largely agricultural economies." Id. See also GRUNWALD ET AL., supra note 99,
at 42 (detailing motivations in creating CACM).
107. Garcia, supra note 93, at 77. See generally Abbot & Bowman, supra note 93, at
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However, by 1991, the CACM nations had recommitted to trade efforts,
and in 1993 entered into a new trade pact to establish a new CACM.Ies
4. The Group of Three (G-3) °9
The Group of Three (G-3) includes Mexico, Venezuela, and Colum-
bia.110 These countries began the implementation process of a free trade
zone in 1993.11 The G-3 free trade agreement covers market access, in-
tellectual property, and investments.112 The G-3 members anticipated ac-
ceding to other regional trade agreements and designed their FTA so that
linking to other agreements like FTAA is possible.' For example, Co-
lumbia and Venezuela are also part of the Andean Pact and are subject to
overlapping commitments, an issue which will also challenge most FTAA
members.114
5. The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) 115
CARICOM, established in 1973, currently includes the thirteen En-
glish-speaking countries of the Caribbean.116 CARICOM has three main
integration goals: economic integration, regional cooperation, and coordi-
nation of foreign policy.11 7 The CARICOM economies have experienced
growth since the late 1980s.118
6. SUMMvARY
The thirty-four democracies of the Western Hemisphere have been es-
tablishing trade agreements between each other for decades. NAFTA,
MERCOSUR, the Andean Pact, CACM, the Group of Three, and CAR-
ICOM will all serve as precursors to what will become a free trade agree-
108. See Garcia, supra note 93, at 77-78. There were also discussions to include Costa
Rica and speculation that the new CACM could merge with G-3. See id.
109. Grupo de los Tres (G-3), June 13, 1994, 197 Integracion Latinoamericana 41
(1994).
110. See Garcia, supra note 93, at 73.
111. See e.g., Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia Ready to Sign G-3 Trade Pact, 10 INt'L
TRADE REP. (BNA) 2053 (1993) [hereinafter Trade Pact]; Garcia, supra note 93, at 73.
112. See, e.g., Trade Pac4 supra note 111; Garcia, supra note 93, at 74.
113. See, e.g., Trade Pact, supra note 111; Garcia, supra note 93, at 74.
114. See Garcia, supra note 93, at 74.
115. CARICOM replaces the more limited Caribbean Free Trade Association that
was created in 1965. See Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Community (CARICOM),
July 4, 1973, 2 BAsic DocuMENTs OF INTERNAnONAL ECONoMII LAW 660 (Stephen
Zamora & Ronal A. Brand eds., 1990).
116. See e.g., Richard Bernal, Regional Trade Agreements in the Western Hemisphere,
8 AM. U. J. hT'L L. & POL'Y 683, 703 (1993); Garcia, supra note 93, at 78.




ment for the Americas. These established trade pacts will have to be
integrated into any new agreement.
The integration factor is relevant because of the need to incorporate
workers rights and labor standards into the FTAA. Of the numerous
agreements established through the Americas, NAFTA is the only agree-
ment that includes labor and environmental standards in its document."19
Although all of the American countries have not previously required
workers' rights standards in their regional agreements, the FTAA should
have such standards.
IV. THE EXPECTATIONS OF NAFTA AND THE REALIZATION OF
THOSE EXPECrATIONS
A. Expectations of Those Supporting NAFTA
In addition to generating more jobs in the United States, NAFTA will
lead to better jobs. Trade expression typically results in increased wages
and higher skilled jobs, of which the livelihood of the American work
force depends. Missing the boat on NAFTA will prevent us from reaping
these potential gains. 2 '
Proponents of NAFTA emphasized that it will stimulate long-term eco-
nomic development in Canada, Mexico, and the United States.' For
instance, while the United States gains investment and employment op-
portunities, Mexico benefits from increased technology and industrializa-
tion.' 22 Supporters further argued that NAFTA was part of an inevitable
trend of a more globalized workforce.Y
Importantly, these gains were expected to decrease illegal immigration
from Mexico into the United States. 24 Illegal immigration would de-
crease, proponents argued, because NAFTA was supposed to create jobs
and increase wages in Mexico, by providing an incentive for Mexicans to
119. See id. at 72.
120. Labor, Business, Agriculture, and Environmental Issues Relating to NAFTA:
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 103rd Cong. 58 (1993) (quoting Robert B.
Reich, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Labor).
121. Barr et. al., supra note 8, at 2.
122. See generally James E. Bailey, Free Trade and the Environment - Can NAFTA
Reconcile the Irreconcilable?, 8 Am. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 839, 843 (1993). See also Barr
et. al., supra note 8, at 3.
123. See Roger W. Wallace & Max Scoular, The North American Free Trade Agree-
ment and United States Employment, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 945, 948 (1993) (explaining how
the United States believed that NAFTA was needed to compete in an expanding global
economy).
124. See Barr et. al., supra note 8, at 3; see also Weintraub, supra note 7, at 309 (writ-
ing that of the estimated six million undocumented aliens in the United States, the majority
are Mexican).
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stay in their native country.' In addition, Mexican citizens were ex-
pected to be able to buy American products with their increased wages
and better jobs, and therefore further augment the economy of the
United States. 2 6
NAFTA's supporters were eager to negotiate the agreement, which led
Congress to authorize fast-track2 7 consideration, allowing debate of the
bill but forbidding amendments."2 Not only was NAFTA expected to
promote the economies of the three nations, it was also going to promote
labor'29 and environmental standards. 3 ° NAALC addresses the labor
standards of NAFTA.
NAALC requires each NAFTA member to abide by eleven labor prin-
ciples. 3 ' The principles include:
1. Freedom of association and protection of the right to organize;
2. The right to bargain collectively;
3. The right to strike;
4. The prohibition of forced labor;
5. Labor protections for children and young persons;
6. Minimum employment standards;
7. Elimination of employment discrimination;
8. Equal pay for women and men;
9. Prevention of occupational injuries and illnesses;
10. Compensation in cases of occupational injuries and illnesses;
and,
11. Protection of migrant workers. 32
125. See Favillo-Solano, supra note 3, at 294-95, 297.
126. See id. at 297.
127. Fast-track authority is discussed in depth in a later section of this comment, but
for a general discussion of fast-track see Jack I. Garvey, A New, Evolution for Fast-Tracking
Trade Agreements: Managing Environmental and Labor Standards Through Ertraterritorial
Regulation, 5 UCLA J. INT'L L & FOREIGN AFF. 1, 7 (2000).
128. See Weintraub, supra note 7, at 565; see also AFL-CIO, FASw-mTAcK: IT'S BACK
(2001) [hereinafter AFL-CIO, FAsT-TRAcK] (criticizing Congressional leaders and Presi-
dent George W. Bush for attempting to push fast track legislation in order to move the
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) agreement through Congress quickly), available
at http://www.aflcio.orglglobaleconomylindex.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2002).
129. NAALC, supra note 2.
130. See North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 13, 1993,
32 I.L.M. 1480 (1993) [hereinafter NAAEC]. See generally Mayer, supra note 87, at 336
(discussing how the American labor and environmental movements have combined forces
to oppose NAFrA).
131. NAALC, supra note 2, at 1513-14.
132. Id. at 1499.
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NAALC's expressed purpose is to safeguard workers' rights in Canada,
Mexico and the United States.1 33 The labor agreement requires each
country to enforce domestic labor laws, establish a commission to pro-
mote collaboration, and resolve labor disputes.134
B. Expectations of Those Opposing NAFTA
"American workers will soon hear a giant sucking sound of jobs be-
ing pulled out of this country."' 3 5
The American labor movement, as well as other interest groups, 3 6 are
concerned with the potential impact NAFTA could have on American
workers. 3 7 Unions predicted that management would use threats of re-
location as a bargaining chip to decrease wages and benefits. s38 The fear
was that lower wages and the relaxed enforcement of labor standards in
Mexico would give manufacturers an incentive to set up more maqui-
ladoras1 39 in Mexico, suppressing the job market in the United States. 4 '
Maquiladoras have an added edge over American labor because Mexico's
work-week is forty-eight hours per week, and can be increased to sixty
hours per week without overtime pay. 41
133. Id. at 1502 (stating in the Preamble that each country has an obligation to pro-
mote employment gains and higher living standards, and also respect labor laws).
134. Favilla-Solano, supra note 3, at 295.
135. See Andrew K. Stutzman, Our Eroding Industrial Base: U.S. Labor Laws Com-
pared with Labor Laws of Less Developed Nations in Light of the Global Economy, 12
DICK. J. INT'L L. 135, 166 n.263 (1992) (citing Mike Robinson, Perot Urges Defeat of Mexi-
can Trade Pact, PHILA. INQ., Oct. 20, 1992, at A17 (quoting 1992 Independent Presidential
Candidate Ross Perot)).
136. Labor unions have been involved in trade issues for some time, but recently,
environmental groups, human-rights organizations, and other activists have joined the op-
position to globalization. See Mayer, supra note 87, at 336.
137. See, e.g., BRONFENBRENNER, supra note 25, at 6; Mayer, supra note 87, at 339;
Stump, supra note 83, at 158.
138. Favilla-Solano, supra note 3, at 300.
139. Generally, the term "maquiladora" refers to sizeable foreign-owned factories in
Mexico that perform final assembly work on parts imported from other countries. See
Nicole Grimm, The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation and its Effects on
Women Working in Mexican Maquiladoras, 48 AM. U. L. REv. 179, 181 n.11 (1998) (citing
Sherri M. Durand, American Maquiladoras: Are They Exploiting Mexico's Working Poor?
128, 129 (1994)). The finished product is then returned back to the parts' nation of origin
for sale, thus taking advantage of cheap Mexican labor. See id.
140. See generally Lance Compa, Labor Rights and Labor Standards in International
Trade, 25 LAW & PoL'Y rt'L Bus. 165 (1993).
141. Federal Job Movement Data and the Implications for NAFTA: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Oversight of Gov't Mgmt. of the Comm. on Govt'l Affairs U.S. S., 103rd
Cong. 103-104 (1993) (statement of Tom Fairfax).
[Vol. 4:307
"IS ANYTHING EVER FREE?"
At the time NAFTA negotiations were taking place, the Mexican mini-
mum wage was 58 cents per hour, while the United States minimum wage
was $4.25 per hour. 4 2 American workers expected to lose a significant
amount of their jobs to Mexico if NAFTA was enacted due to this great
disparity in wages.143 A company could easily view United States labor
standards as problematic and shift operations to Mexico where the indus-
try climate is more "sympathetic" to business (i.e. less regulation, cheaper
labor, and ineffective unions).' These incentives to move to Mexico are
what many commentators have termed "industrial flight" or the "race to
the bottom."' 45
C. Realization of the Expectations
While supporters of NAFTA in the United States looked forward to
economic development and increased competitiveness, opponents antici-
pated job migration to Mexico and deterioration in labor standards.146 It
has been over seven years since NAFTA and NAALC were enacted,
enough time to gauge whose expectations may have been realized.
1. Proponents' Viewpoint
Those who view increased trade, like that created by NAFTA, as a
source of job security in the United States focus on the increase of ex-
ports as particularly important. 47 In the simplest of terms, exports create
jobs, while imports take jobs away. 4 Between 1993 and 1997, United
States exports to Mexico grew 69% to total $71 billion.1 49 Accordingly,
142. Robert B. Cohen & Clyde V. Prestowitz, Jr., Outlook, WiAsn. PosT, Apr. 15,
1996, at 1C.
143. See Parks, supra note 33, at 17.
144. See Eugene Robinson, East and West: A Gloomy Economic Forecast, WAsH.
PosT, Apr. 12, 1993, at Al.
145. Justice Louis Brandeis has been credited with coining the phrase "race to the
bottom," which is often mentioned in the context of globalization. See William J. Cary,
Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L J. 663, 664 (1974)
(discussing Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 559 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) in which
Brandeis stated that "the race was one not of diligence but of laxity"); see also Matthew W.
Fmkin, International Governance and Domestic Convergence in Labor Law as Seen from
the American Midwest, 76 IND. L.J. 143, 164 (2001).
146. See generally Mayer, supra note 87, at 340; BRONFE-N RENNER, supra note 25, at
5.
147. ROBERT E. Scor, THE FAcrs AnouT TRADE AND JOn CREATION: Issu BRmEF
#139, available at http://www.epinet.org (last visited Apr. 3, 2002).
148. Id.
149. Ir'L TRADE ADMINiS'RATON, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Exports to Mexico,
[hereinafter Exports to Mexico] available at httpJ/vww.ita.doc.gov.
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Mexico receives the most foreign direct investment (FDI)1-5  of any coun-
try in the world. 1'
The State of Texas best serves NAFTA proponent's arguments that the
treaty is beneficial to the United States. Arguably, Texas has benefited
more than any other state. 52 By 1997, exports from Texas to Mexico had
grown by 21%. 111 The U.S. Department of Commerce has determined
that 378,000 jobs in Texas are based on Mexican exports.'54 Notably, San
Antonio, Texas, with its close location to Monterrey, Mexico, is becoming
a distribution hub and service provider to Northern Mexico.155 Major
law and accounting firms are establishing offices in San Antonio in an
attempt to attract clients interested in the Mexican market.156 In addi-
tion, the North American Development Bank (NADBank), a component
of the entire NAFTA package, is located in San Antonio. 57
D. Broken Promises
1. Opponents' Viewpoint
In sharp contrast to NAFTA's long-time supporters, many have con-
cluded that NAFTA has created more problems than it has eliminated.
Unfortunately, while NAFTA's text suggests that it promotes basic labor
principles, this is only an aspiration, instead of a required obligation. 158
150. The phrase "foreign direct investment" refers to investment in a firm of one na.
tion by multinational corporations based in another nation. See BRONFENiORENNER, supra
note 25, at 5 n.1. See generally, Clark & Velazquez, supra note 90, at 749 (discussing for-
eign direct investment in general as well as using Nicaragua as a case study to detail the
impact of FDI in Latin American countries).
151. Weinstein, supra note 3, at 110 (recognizing that Mexico's participation in
NAFTA has been beneficial for that country). From 1988 to 1994, American FDI grew
annually by a multiple of six, reaching $12 billion. See, e.g., Clark & Velazquez, supra note
90, at 749. The United States' FDI reached approximately $14.3 billion by 1998. Id. By
1999, Latin America and the Caribbean received $97 billion in investments from abroad,
Id. This amount exceeded that of Asia, something that had not happened in thirteen years.
Id. See also Matt Moffett, Latin America Tops Asia in Luring Foreign Investors, WALL Sr.
J., Feb. 22, 2000, at A21.
152. Weinstein, supra note 3, at 110.
153. EXPORTS TO MExico, supra note 149.
154. Weinstein, supra note 3, at 110 (finding that Texas has about three and one-half
times the number of Mexican export related jobs than California).
155. Dan McGraw, Happily Ever NAFTA?, U.S. NEws & WoRLD REP., Oct. 28, 1996,
at 46, 48.
156. Id.
157. North American Development Bank, General Overview, at http://
www.nadbank.org/English/general/generaLmain.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2002).
158. See Finkin, supra note 145, at 148; see also Clyde Summers, NAFT4"s Labor Side
Agreement and International Labor Standards, 3 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 173, 179,
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The trade deficit, the ineptitude of NAALC, and job losses in various
industries are major concerns.
While NAFTA supporters have pointed to increased exports, oppo-
nents have insisted that the United States trade deficit with Mexico and
Canada are instead the keys to evaluate the agreement's success or
failure.159
Looking at exports while ignoring the effects of imports is like trying
to keep score in a baseball game by adding up the runs scored by one
team and ignoring those scored by the other. In this case, the score,
i.e., the trade balance, is the difference between exports (which cre-
ate jobs) and imports (which destroy them). If imports increase
more rapidly than exports, as they have in this economic expansion,
the net effect will be to reduce growth and employment.160
According to a poll of Americans in 1993, unemployment, the federal
deficit, and taxes were the most important economic issues facing the
United States.' 61 However, by 1998, for the first time ever, Americans
said that the United States trade deficit was the most important economic
issue facing the country. 6 2
Actual trade deficit issues, as well as American concern with the trade
deficit, are relevant to union organizing drives. American workers realize
that jobs and the trade deficit are interrelated, as evident in the poll re-
sults. 63 This effects union organizing drives because workers relate the
trade deficit to their job security.'t
186 (1999) (noting that NAALC only requires the member countries to observe and en-
force its own laws).
159. See Scorr, supra note 147.
160. See id. See also BRONFENBRENNER, supra note 25, at 6.
161. See BRONFENBRENNER, supra note 25, at 7.
162. See id.
163. See id. at 7. As American corporations continue to migrate around the globe in
search of cheaper labor, American workers have begun to realize that their job security is
determined, in part, by the trade deficit. This concern is reflected in the 1998 poll, wherein
a greater percent of Americans now consider the trade deficit to be the most important
economic issue facing the country. See also ROBERT E. Scorr, NAFTA's PAIN DEJ'mEs,
available at httpJ/wwv.epinet.org/uniondifference/uniondiffll.htm (stating that "if current
trends continue, the U.S. trade deficit attributable to NAFTA is likely to double in 1999,
leading to a rapid increase in the numbers of jobs lost").
164. See BRONFENBRENNER, supra note 25, at 12 (suggesting that due to the post-
NAFTA climate, plant closing threats during union organizing drives have increased in the
last five years); Rachel Li Wai Sven, You Sure Know Hoe to Pick 'Ent: Human Rights and
Migrant Farm Workers in Canada, 15 GEO. IMMIGR. LJ. 199 (2000) (discussing the short-
comings in NAALC); Sheryl Dickey, The Free Trade of the Americas and Human Rights
Concern, 8 HuM. Rrs. BRIEF 26 (2001) (stating how NAALC lacks enforceable remedies).
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The second major concern with NAFTA is the NAALC's lack of effec-
tiveness. 165 The common sentiment among labor advocates is that
NAALC fails to provide safeguards for workers, evidenced in the lack of
the ability to secure sanctions against employers. 66 NAALC clearly em-
phasizes improving labor standards, living conditions, and workers'
rights. 67 These initiatives are important to workers around the world,
and in the United States, these provisions are especially important to mi-
norities and women' 68
The first two complaints under NAALC were filed separately on Feb-
ruary 14, 1994, against Honeywell and General Electric. 69 Neither com-
pany was found to have violated any of the NAALC provisions. 7
Interestingly, by April 2001, there had been 23 complaints filed under
NAALC, but not one has resulted in any sanctions for labor rights
violations.'
7 1
Finally, NAFTA opponents cite enormous job losses as a ramification
of NAFTA. At the most extreme end, one report indicates that by 1999
all fifty states and the District of Columbia had suffered approximately
440,000 job losses due to NAFTA imports. 72
One key source in identifying the job losses directly associated with
NAFTA is the NAFTA Transitional Adjustment Assistance Program
(NAFTA-TAA).' 73 NAFTA-TAA acts as a welfare program, to help
165. See Adams & Singh, supra note 23, 162 (explaining that trade unionists and
friends of organized labor called the agreement a sham, and the AFL-CIO characterized
the NAALC as representing a weakening of remedies available under U.S. law); see also
Human Rights Watch, NAFTA Labor Accord Ineffective: Future Trade Pacts Must Avoid
Pitfalls, available at http:lwww.hrw.orglpress/2001/04/nafta04l6.htm (last visited Feb. 12.
2002).
166. See Allen R. Myerson, U.S. Backs Mexico Law, Vexing Labor, N.Y Times, Oct.
13, 1994, at D1 available at 1991 WL 2081503; see also C. O'Neal Taylor, Fast-track, Trade
Policy, and Free Trade Agreements: Why the NAFTA Turned into a Battle, 28 GEo. WAstu.
J. IN'L. L. & ECON. 1, 65 (1994).
167. NAALC, supra note 2, at 1502-03. The preamble of NAACL states that the in-
tent of the agreement is to improve worker's rights, living conditions, and improve working
conditions. See id.
168. See Champion, supra note 20, at 226-27 (noting the NAALC's objectives to in-
clude "equal pay regardless of gender" and the "protection of migrant workers").
169. Adams & Singh, supra note 23, at 168.
170. Id. at 168-170.
171. NAFTA Labor Accord Ineffective, supra note 165 (noting that alleged violators
include General Electric, Honeywell, Sony, General Motors, McDonald's, Sprint, and the
Washington State apple industry)
172. See Scor, supra note 147.
173. See 19 U.S.C. § 2331 (1998) (allowing the U.S. Department of Labor to adminis-
ter NAFTA-TAA).
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manufacturing workers whose unemployment is directly or indirectly"7
related to NAFTA.175 In 1996, 94,161 displaced workers received
NAFTA-TAA benefits. 76 By July 2001, 355,992 workers had been certi-
fied to receive aid through NAFTA-TAA.'" Notably, Texas has the most
certified workers of any other state with 33,919.171
However, NAFTA-TAA does not reveal the whole picture of NAFTA-
related job losses. This is because some displaced workers fail to apply
for the program, because they do not even realize their job loss was
caused by NAFrA, and/or they simply use traditional unemployment
programs.' 79 Undoubtedly, job losses due to NAFTA are difficult to cal-
culate, but it is a consensus that certain industries, like manufacturing, are
more adversely affected than others. 80
Job losses in the manufacturing industry are the most alarming. While
women make up 35% of the manufacturing industry, Blacks and Latinos
account for 9% and 6% of the industry.18' This is significant because
women, Blacks, and Latinos account for 51% of NAFTA job losses, al-
most exactly corresponding with their representation in the manufactur-
174. Unfortunately, NAFTA-TAA only applies to manufacturing jobs, so non-manu-
facturing jobs lost from decreased exports or increased imports are not accounted for. See
Raftery, supra note 80, at 180-82. Another example of a business not being covered by
NAFrA-TAA, is a coffee shop that is across the street from a plant. See id. If the plant
closes down because of NAFTA regulations, then the coffee shop owner is not covered
under NAFTA-TAA because it does not produce a manufactorable product. See id.
175. Id. at 160 (explaining how the Transitional Adjustment Assistance Program
works to ameliorate the negative impact of NAFTA on United States workers).
176. Id. at 180 (noting the number of petitions offered by Transitional Adjustment
Assistance Program benefits).
177. PuBuc CITIZEN, A SAMPLING of NAFTA RELATED Jon Loss: NAFTA-TAA
(2001) [hereinafter Public Citizen, SAMPLING] (noting the increase in workers to receive
assistance) available at http.//vwv.citizen.orgpctradetaa97acslKEYTAA.html (Mar. 3,
2002).
178. PuBUc CrmzEN, NAFTA-TAA: STATE TOTALS (2001) [hereinafter Puouc Cm.
zEN, ToTAIs] (reporting the individual state totals of workers receiving assistance from the
Transitional Adjustment Assistance Program) available at http://iwww.citizen.orgtpctrade/
taa97acs/naftataa.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2002).
179. See Raftery, supra note 80, at 182; see also Lusane, supra note 16, at 440-441
(explaining that even some workers who know about the Transitional Adjustment Assis-
tance program have more success obtaining relief from state or federal programs).
180. See Raftery, supra note 80, at 182 (noting that NAFTA-TAA was created to deal
with the expected manufacturing sector job losses); see also Lusane, supra note 16, at 440-
441 (identifying NAFTA-TAA as the mechanism created to address NAFTA job losses
because "even its supporters understood that a significant number of jobs would be lost").
181. See Jesse Rothstein & Robert E. Scott, NAFTA's Casualties: Employment Ef-
fects on Men, Women, and Minorities: Issue Brief #120, available at httpJ/www.epinet.org/
Issuebriefslibl20.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2002).
2002]
THE SCHOLAR
ing industry."8 According to the U.S. Department of Commerce, in 1999
alone, a total of 341,000 manufacturing jobs were lost in the United
States.83 In 1998, manufacturing workers were the largest percentage of
displaced workers at 27%."84
The statistics regarding blacks, other minorities, and the manufacturing
industry lead directly to the issue discussed in this comment. The purpose
of this comment is to address a fourth significant problem with NAFTA-
its effect on union organizing drives and the subsequent impact on the
minority community. It is not uncommon in the United States for neutral
laws to produce a negative outcome that discriminates based on race or
gender.185
V. THE PROBLEM
NAFTA has created some substantial problems that must be reviewed
before a trade agreement is established encompassing the Western
Hemisphere.
A. Job Insecurity
"Not just greater mobility, but the threat of it helps hold down
wages.'
18 6
Using basic theories of labor economics, it is easy to conclude that the
tight labor market in the United States during the 1990s should have re-
sulted in increased wages and increased job security for American work-
ers.'87 However, from 1992-1996, most American workers' wages fell."88
Many workers have to work two or more jobs, longer hours, and/or over-
time to survive. 1 89 A living wage for one adult and two children is
$30,000 a year (a total calculated to include no luxuries), but many em-
ployers do not provide this amount to entry-level workers.190
182. Id.
183. BRONFENBRENNER, supra note 25, at 5.
184. Lusane, supra note 16, at 440-441.
185. This is one reason that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted. 42
U.S.C § 2000 (e)(1)-(17) (1988) (prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of
race, color, religion, gender or national origin).
186. Louis Uchitelle, Shifting Workplace; Renewed Corporate Wonderlust Puts a Quiet
Brake on Salaries, N.Y. TIMEs, July 24,2000, at Al (quoting Harvard University economist
Lawrence F. Katz).
187. BRONFENBRENNER, supra note 25.
188. Id. at 1.
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Working in a profitable industry and building a solid work record no
longer translates into job security for Americans.1 91 "From individual
plant closings to the virtual collapse of entire domestic industries, from
wage concessions to lost or abandoned elections for union representa-
tion," the reality of globalization and capital mobility has a direct effect
on the perception of lack of job security for American workers.19
Although the nation was in the midst of an economic boom during the
1990s, it was estimated that nine out of ten Americans were fearful about
job security.19 Interestingly, workers today are three times more inse-
cure about losing their jobs in the current economy than they were during
the 1980-1981 recession. 94 This increased job insecurity can be partially
attributed to NAFrA.195
Changes in trade policy have a significant effect on perceptions of job
stability. Americans realize that employers can easily find cheaper labor
and imports in developing countries. 96 Fears of job loss have a direct
relationship on wages. Employees are afraid to ask for wage increases
because they understand that cheaper labor is available elsewhere, prima-
rily Mexico. 197
B. Impact of Threats of Plant Closure on Union Organizing Drives
Cutting production costs is a dominant strategy for increasing manufac-
turers' profits.' 98 American workers are aware of plant closings and
"downsizing," and employers capitalize on this by keeping wages low.
99
NAF-TA has furthered the need for companies to stay competitive in the
global economy, and many employers use the threat of plant closures and
capital flight as a bargaining chip in their anti-unionization campaigns~o°
The typical threat of plant closure occurs once the perceived danger of
unionization appears.2 m Many employers threaten their workers that
191. See Frances Lee Ansley, Rethinking Law in Globalization Labor Markets, 1 U.
PA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 369, 372 (1998) (crediting globalization for the lack of job security in
many blue-collar industries).
192. See id. at 372-73. See also COMMUNITY AND CAPITAL IN CoNacr PLANT
CLOSINGS AND JOB Loss (John C. Raines et al. eds., 1982) (describing individual plant
closings and the effect on the communities involved).
193. BRONFENBRENNER, supra note 25, at 4.
194. Id.
195. Weintraub, supra note 7, at 307.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. See Ansley, supra note 191, at 370-71 (finding that one way that employers are
cutting production costs is to use third-world workers at lower wages).
199. BRONFENBRENNER, supra note 25, at 7.
200. Id. at 8.
201. See id. at 7; Ansley, supra note 191, at 374.
2002]
THE SCHOLAR
their plant will close down if a union is recognized. 2" Employers simply
state that they cannot afford required union wages and benefits.203
Workers then are afraid to join the union because of the fear that the
plant could close down and they would be left jobless.
A study commissioned by NAALC summarized that "half of all em-
ployers involved in private sector certification election campaigns
threatened to shut down all or part of their operations if workers voted
for a union."' However, only 15% of the employers shut down all or
part of its operations after the union won the election." 5
This study reveals that employers are threatening to close manufactur-
ing plants at an alarming rate, regardless of whether they actually will
follow through with the threat after union success. The reality of NAFTA
and the perception that companies can globalize and relocate give more
credibility to threats of plant closure. The result of these threats indicates
a direct relationship between NAFTA and union organizing drives.
NAFTA reinforces the perception that employers are more mobile and
can easily move if a union wins an organizing campaign.
NAALC's ineffectiveness and lack of sanctions, actual job losses, and
the threat of job losses have all participated in impacting union organiz-
ing. NAFTA is the base of this combination of negative influences.
Therefore, a FTAA will further the problems of union organizing drives,
minorities, and women, if it is modeled after NAFTA's flaws.
C. Exponential Impact on Women and Minorities
Generally, trends that negatively impact American workers, like
globalization, have an exponentially depressing impact on women and
minorities. To put it simply, if NAFTA is bad for unions, then it is bad for
women and minorities to the second power. Women and minorities have
faced a history of inequalities, therefore adding to the problems associ-
ated with NAFTA through FrAA just exacerbates an already existing
dilemma. This is why union membership and the benefits of collective
bargaining are important for women and minorities.
202. See Ansley, supra note 191, at 374. The author describes an actual situation that
occurred where if union members did not agree with company officials, management
would make remarks such as "You're going to drive us to Mexico" or "This is the kind of
thing that will force us to move to Mexico." Id.
203. Dickey, supra note 164, at 27.
204. NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON LABOR COOPERATION (NAALC), PLANT
CLOSINGS AND WORKERS RIG-: A REPORT TO THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OV TIE
SECRETARIAT OF THE COMMISSIONS FOR LABOR COOPERATION (1997).
205. Id.
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Women and minorities are subject to discrimination even today as evi-
denced by the "pay gap.' '2°6 Union membership, however, narrows the
historic "pay gap" between whites and non-whites and between men and
women. According to the U.S. Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor
Statistics, workers that belong to unions earn 28% more than non-union
members, and are more likely to receive health care and pension bene-
fits.' 7 Women in unions earn 31% more than women who are not. °
Black workers make 37% more than non-unionized Blacks, while Latino
workers earn 55% more than non-union Latinos2 0 9
Furthering the plight of women and minorities, NAFTA is adversely
affecting the manufacturing industry.21 0 Women and minorities represent
a significant portion of individuals losing their jobs due to NAFTA be-
cause of their location in the manufacturing industry.211 To make matters
worse, the lost manufacturing jobs are replaced by service industry jobs
which pay less and offer fewer benefits. 12 Although NAFTA's goals are
supposed to be gender neutral and racially blind, the consequences for
minorities and women cannot be ignored. Corporations taking advantage
of globalization may not have a racist or sexist intent, but they are effec-
tively producing discriminatory results as well as exacerbating inequali-
ties that have long existed in the American workplace2 13
A decrease in union organizing drives and the protections unionization
offers can be directly linked to NAFTA, as can be seen in the effect of
threats of plant closure. Unions are proven to help minorities and wo-
men because of their emphasis on equal pay and collective bargaining. If
unions are impacted by NAFTA, then it has an indirect, but substantial
effect on minorities and women who are aided by union membership.
206. AFL-CIO, UNIONS RAISE WAGES- ESPECIALLY FOR MINoRmEs AND WOMEN,
[hereinafter AFL-CIO, WAGES] available at httpJvww.aflcio.orgluniondiffercncc/
uniondiff4.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2002).
207. Id. (analyzing the median weekly earnings of full time wage and salary workers
for the year 2000); AFL-CIO, UNION WoRKERs HAVE BMTER BEnEFrs, [hereinafter
AFL-CIO, BENFrs] available at http/Ilwww.aflcio.orgluniondifferenceuniondiff6.htm
(last visited Feb. 2, 2002).
208. AFL-CIO, WAGES, supra note 206.
209. Id.
210. Lusane, supra note 16, at 446.
211. See Scott, supra note 163 at 2. Over seventy-five percent of the jobs lost due to
NAFrA were in the manufacturing sector. Id. "Between 1993 and 1996, blacks lost 36,890
jobs, and Hispanics last 22,520 jobs, numbers closely reflecting these groups' shares in man-
ufacturing industries. Moreover, a disproportionate number of the jobs eliminated by
NAFrA were manufacturing jobs." Rothstein & Scott, supra note 31.
212. Lusane, supra note 16, at 446.
213. Id. at 439 (writing that "global corporate norms, while perhaps not racist in in-
tent, increasingly produce racist outcomes").
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VI. ALTERNATIVES AND ENHANCEMENTS TO NAFTA - SUGGESTIONS
FOR FTAA
"FTAA is like NAFTA on steroids."214
The trilateral free trade agreement between the United States, Mexico,
and Canada is inherently distinguished from a hemispheric agreement
that will encompass most of the Western Hemisphere, primarily due to its
complexity.21 5 However, NAFTA set the stage for FTAA, and is the ba-
sis for FTAA negotiations.21 6
NAFTA would be an excellent model for FTAA if promoting corpo-
rate interests were its only purpose.217 Although NAFTA instigated the
process to enact FTAA,2 1 1 other alternatives or alterations to NAFTA
should be examined. This is because FFAA has the potential of having
the same negative impact on unions, organizing drives, women, and mi-
norities.219 There are plausible alternatives to the NAFTA-NAALC
model that work more for furthering workers' rights instead of the corpo-
rate agenda.
A. Corporate Fines
The National Labor Relations Board's (NLRB) traditional remedies
for labor violations in the United States are not effective or coercive in
preventing employers from violating workers' rights.220 Therefore, work-
ers rights provisions included in a free trade agreement must be clear and
214. See AFL-CIO, FAsT-TRACK, supra note 128.
215. Weintraub, supra note 7, at,312 (2000) (comparing NAFTA to the proposed
FrAA).
216. Id. at 313 (noting, however, that hemispheric-wide free trade will not result in an
expansion of NAFTA).
217. AFL-CIO, FAsT-TRACK, supra note 128 (criticizing Congressional leaders and
President George W. Bush for attempting to push fast-track legislation in order to move
the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) agreement through Congress quickly); see
also Weintraub, supra note 7, at 313 (determining that "FTAA will come into existence
only if the U.S. president is granted fast-track authority).
218. See Weintraub, supra note 7, at 304 (stating that it is incorrect to characterize the
FTAA as an extension of NAFTA, but rather the FTAA is a single undertaking which
leaves NAFTA intact).
219. See Blum, supra note 19, at 437 (claiming that environmental concerns have been
kept off the FTAA agenda); see also Lopez, supra note 32, at 31 (comparing NAFTA's
political concerns with those that potentially could affect the FTAA); AFL-CIO, UNION
DIFFERENCE: UNIONS ARE IMPORTANT FOR MINORITIES, available at http://www.aflcio.org
/uniondifference/uniondiffl2.htm [hereinafter AFL-CIO, MINORrrIEs] (last visited Apr. 2,
2002).
220. See Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization
Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1787-1795 (1983) (agreeing with the Labor
Reform Act remedy that would have allowed double wages and no deduction for mitiga-
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forceful. Severe monetary penalties for individual companies that fail to
follow labor standards are one suggestionm21 Any system that intends to
protect employee rights will only be as effective as the remedies af-
forded.' NAALC only allows for sanctions against the nation, i.e. na-
tionwide enforcement.22 Therefore, there is a lack of responsibility for
individual companies.
Monetary penalties would aid the United States particularly when
manufacturers threaten plant closures during union organizing cam-
paigns.2 4 There should be a substantial fine. NAALC fails to provide
such a remedy m  as no sanctions have been imposed to date?26 Since
the corporate agenda focuses on capital gains, worker's rights violations
should be remedied by imposing monetary fines on these businesses;
therefore, any violation would motivate the corporate world to clean-up
their business practices in a manner employers will pay attention to.
B. NAFTA-TAA
NAFTA-TAA provides beneficial data on workers displaced due to
NAFTA.127 But, NAFTA-TAA has limitations and needs to be im-
proved.2" The FTAA should implement a program similar to NAFTA-
TAA, but one that also considers all jobs affected by the implementation
of FrAA, not just the manufacturing industry. Applicants will need to
demonstrate the connection between their job loss and the implementa-
tion for employees who have been discriminatorily discharged during a union organization
campaign.)
221. See NAALC, supra note 2. A monetary fine can only be imposed if a nation
pervasively fails to enforce its own national labor laws. See id.
222. Lack of remedial power for the National Labor Relations Board was one con-
cern that initiated the proposal of the Labor Reform Act of 1977. See Cox Er At-, supra
note 38, at 253. The Labor Reform Act passed the House of Representatives in 1977, but
fell victim to a nineteen-day filibuster in the Senate. See S. 2467, 95th Cong. (1978); H.R.
8410, 95th Cong. (1977).
223. See NAALC, supra note 2; see also Grimm, supra note 139, at 195 (explaining
that NAALC's enforcement operates through National Administrative Offices (NAOs)).
224. Threats of plant closure to prevent union success are illegal under the National
Labor Relations Act, but no fine or monetary penalty is imposed. See NLRA, supra note
44. But see Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965) (holding
that a complete plant shutdown by an employer does not violate the National Labor Rela-
tions Act if the employer was not trying to discourage unionization elsewhere).
225. Bobbi-Lee Meloro, Balancing the Goals of Free Trade with Workers' Rights in a
Hemispheric Economy, 30 U. Mi~mi Im-mR-Arf. L REv. 433, 455-56 (1998) (noting that
NAALC has been criticized for its weakness and ineffectiveness).
226. See Garvey, supra note 127, at 16 (stating that sanctions are unlikely because the
structure of NAALC is designed for cooperative resolution by consent to an action plan).
227. See Raftery, supra note 80, at 160-61.
228. See id. at 186-87.
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tion of FTAA. Administering welfare programs are expensive, but such
programs are the only effective means to track the inevitable American
job losses caused by a free trade agreement.
C. Private Litigation
Another alternative is private litigation. Free trade agreements fail to
expressly allow private rights of action that enable national law to enforce
claims through domestic courts.229 Domestic common law tort claims,
such as, negligence, intentional torts, or nuisance, are options for individ-
uals opposing American corporations on foreign soil.23 Parties have had
success using case-by-case litigation in United States courts.
In Dow Chemical v. Alfaro,-3' the Texas Supreme Court found that the
claims of foreign workers against their United States employers may be
tried on the merits, despite Dow Chemical's claim of forum non con-
232veniens. However, claims for personal injuries occurring outside the
United States caused by an American employer's negligence would usu-
ally face problems with forum non convenens.23 3
D. Fast-Track Authority
Beginning in 1974, the United States' Congress used fast-track author-
ity for all significant trade legislation.23 4 Fast track allows international
trade agreements to be pushed through Congress without any amend-
ments.23 5 Opponents of globalization suggest, "as it stands, fast-track
would aid powerful corporations searching the globe for cheap la-
bor-lowering standards globally for workers' right, public health, con-
sumers and the environment., 23 6
Both former President Bill Clinton and President George W. Bush
have failed to get fast-track approval for FTAA. The last fast-track au-
thority expired at the end of 1994.237 In 1997, Congress refused fast-track
229. Garvey, supra note 127, at 24.
230. Id. at 27.
231. 786 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. 1990), cert. den., 498 U.S. 1024 (1991).
232. Dow Chemical v. Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. 1990), cert. den, 498 U.S. 1024
(1991) (allowing foreign employees of U.S. multinational corporations to sue in Texas
courts).
233. Garvey, supra note 127, at 27-30 (citing Piper Aircraft v. Reyno 454 U.S. 235
(1981) as the leading authority on the forum non conveniens doctrine).
234. See Mayer, supra note 87, at 337.
235. Charles Tiefer, "Alongside" the Fast-track: Environmental and Labor Issues in
FTAA, 7 MN w. J. GLOBAL TRADE 329, 329 (1998).
236. AFL-CIO, FAST-TRAcK, supra note 128.
237. See Mayer, supra note 87, at 337 (stating that the last fast track authority ended
when Congress approved the Uraguay Round og the GATI).
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authority that would have helped approve FTAA more quicklyl In
2001, President George W. Bush attempted to get passage of "trade pro-
motion authority," but the fast track was again rejected by Congress?3 9
Opponents of NAFTA utilize a "race to the bottom" theory, which
contends that multinational corporations will find the cheapest labor and
the least regulations possible, particularly in Mexico.24 The predictions
were realized. The documented industrial flight that has occurred in the
years since NAIFTA's passage justified Congress' refusal to grant fast-
track authority? 4 For the problems created by NAFTA, Congress
should continue not to enact fast track authorization for FTAA, as it did
with NAFTA.
E. Eliminating "Side" Accords
Unlike NAFTA, labor concerns should be part of the main text of
FTAA, instead of a separate side agreement.242 This concept was utilized
in the U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement.243 Both countries committed
to core labor standards and enforcing labor laws. 2? Although the agree-
ment between the United States and Jordan is not a comprehensive solu-
tion, it does provide a starting point for FTAA, with the notion of
emphasizing labor concerns within the document itself.
Inclusion of labor standards in the main text indicates that violators are
more likely to be punished. Presumably, this approach allows labor rights
to be "enforced through the same powerful state imposed trade sanctions
available for the resolution of commercial and other 'normal'
disputes. 245
VII. CONCLUSION
NAFTA, along with the global economy, has made many employees
fearful that they are dispensable. Job insecurity and threats of relocation
have made many American workers afraid to join unions. NAFrA also
has a negative effect on minorities and women, which is especially evi-
238. Tiefer, supra note 235, at 329; see also Mayer, supra note 87, at 337.
239. Parks, supra note 33, at 17.
240. See Garvey, supra note 127, at 7; see also Finkin, supra note 145, at 148 (criticiz-
ing international regulations that do not promote a "race to the top" in developing
countries).
241. Id.
242. See Dickey, supra note 203, at 27.
243. See id. On October 24, 2000, former President Bill Clinton signed the United
States-Jordan Agreement. Id.
244. Id. at 27 (noting that trade between the U.S. and Jordan is significantly less than
trade between the three NAFTA countries).
245. See Ansley, supra note 191, at 410-11.
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dent in the manufacturing industry. FTAA could have the same devastat-
ing impact if NAFTA is its blueprint.
The fact that globalization has a negative impact on union organizing
drives is important to women and minorities. Union membership pro-
vides the power of collective bargaining, while highlighting the need for
equal standards for all workers.
Admittedly, NAFrA made a step in the right direction through
NAALC as it recognizes the connection between free trade and workers'
rights. But, NAFTA and NAALC fall far short of the perfect model. If
NAFTA is the blueprint, then FTAA, which will encompass 34 countries
in North, Central, and South America,246 will have a more devastating
effect on union organizing, minorities, and women. Therefore, other al-
ternatives should be utilized. Union organizing drives and workers' rights
should not continue to pay for free trade.
246. See AFL-CIO, WORKING FAMILIEs, GLOBAL UNIONS RALLY FOR FAIR TRADE,
available at http://www.aflcio.org/news/2001/0418_ftaa.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2002).
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